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Abstract
In the context of the U.S farm policy, this paper analyzes the effect that expec-
tations about base updating in future policies have on a farmer’s acreage decision in
the presence of price, yield and policy uncertainty. We consider a risk neutral farmer
producing a single crop whose income consists of market revenue and government
payments. We consider two policy regimes. Decisions made in the current policy
regime are linked to government payments in the future policy regime through the
possibility of a base update in the future regime. There is policy uncertainty about the
possibility of a base update being allowed in the future. We combine stochastic dy-
namic programming with present value calculations to link current acreage decisions
to future program payments. The average optimal planted acreage is weakly increas-
ing in the subjective probability of the future base update. The maximum percentage
increase in the average optimal planted acreage is 6%.
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The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994 was the first time that a major step was taken towards reducing the trade
distortions caused by domestic agricultural subsidies. Domestic subsidies were classified
into three categories or “boxes” according to the level of distortion that they caused. The
amber-box contains the most distorting subsidies and are therefore required to be limited
in use. The blue-box payments also cause some distortion but are required to be
production limiting. The green-box contains the subsidies that cause no or minimal
distortion. The subsidies in the blue- and green-boxes are currently excluded from all
WTO disciplines. Decoupled payments fall under the green-box. They are defined as
payments that are (i) financed by taxpayers, (ii) not related to current production, factor
use, or prices and, (iii) the eligibility criteria are defined by a fixed, historical base period.
Furthermore, no production is required to receive these payments. Since there are no
restrictions on their use, they have come to play an important role in providing support to
farmers, especially in industrialized countries.
In the United States, decoupled payments were first introduced in the 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in the form of production flexibility
contract (PFC) payments. These were continued as direct payments (DP) in the 2002 Farm
Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act. The EU too has been moving towards decou-
pled support with the 1992 MacSharry reforms, Agenda 2000 and CAP Mid-Term Review
(MTR) in 2003 with a Single Farm Payment (SFP). The trend has been to cut support prices
while compensating farmers with decoupled payments.
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Recently though, green-box subsidies, especially decoupled payments, have come un-
der scrutiny. The WTO rulings against the United States in the cotton dispute (WTO 2004,
WTO 2005) has brought the U.S. direct payments under the spotlight. There is an ongoing
debate over the impact that decoupled payments have on farmer decisions. The literature on
decoupled payments has identified five major “coupling” mechanisms of decoupled pay-
ments1. First, under decreasing absolute risk aversion preferences, decoupled payments
reduce the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (wealth effect) and income variability (in-
surance effect) (Hennessy 1998, Sckokai and Moro 2006). Second, in the presence of im-
perfect credit markets, decoupled payments can ease the credit constraints faced by farmers
(Roe et al. 2003, Goodwin and Mishra 2006). Third, decoupled payments can influence the
labor supply decisions of farmers, by affecting the choice between leisure and total labor
supply or between on- and off-farm labor supply (El-Osta et al. 2004, Ahearn et al. 2006).
Fourth, decoupled payments increase land values and rents since they are non-stochastic
and are paid on historical acreage (Goodwin et al. 2003a, Goodwin et al. 2003b, Roberts
et al. 2003). Fifth, expectations about future decoupled payments can influence current
decisions of farmers (Sumner 2003, McIntosh et al. 2007, Coble et al. 2007). Our article
formally explores this fifth mechanism. The case of base acreage updating of the DPs al-
lowed in the 2002 FSRI Act in the United States illustrates the relevance of exploring the
mechanisms linking current acreage and future payments. Sumner 2003 develops a degree
of linkage between payments that might involve base updating and current production. The
degree of linkage measures the contribution of current production to the present value of
1For a detailed review of the literature on decoupled payments, see Bhaskar and Beghin 2007.
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future payments. A high value of the degree of linkage implies that DPs have a strong link
to current production. McIntosh et al. 2007 conduct an experiment to study the effect of
expectations about a future possibility of base acreage updating on allocation decisions of
the participants between a program and non-program crop. They find that the possibility of
a future base acreage update increases the allocation towards the program crop by around
8%. Using a survey of Iowa and Mississippi farmers, Coble et al. 2007 observe that farmers
believe there is a 40% chance that base acreage or yield updates will be allowed in the 2007
Farm Bill. They also find that the willingness to accept a one time payment in-lieu of an
opportunity to update base is positively affected by a greater expectation of an update.
Complementary to Sumner 2003, McIntosh et al. 2007 and Coble et al. 2007, our ap-
proach formalizes and quantifies the influence of expected payments under future policy
which might allow a base update on acreage decisions under current policy. We account
for the stochastic and dynamic environment in which farmers operate. We analyze the im-
pact of base updating on a risk neutral farmer’s acreage decision in the presence of price,
yield and policy uncertainty. The farmer makes acreage planting decisions in the current
policy regime, (2002-2006), not knowing the policies that will be in place in the future
policy regime (the duration of the 2007 Farm Bill). If base updating is allowed in the future
regime, then the new base acreage for DPs, is considered to be the average of the planted
acreage in the current regime. The subjective beliefs of the farmer formed under the current
Farm Bill, regarding a future base update occurring is discretized into five values, starting
from 0 (no update) to 1 (certain update) in increments of 0.25. The farmer’s problem is
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to maximize the present value of expected profits by choosing acreage during 2002-2006
while taking into account the possibility of a future base update. Thus the farmer cares not
only about her current income but also about her future stream of income.
The solution to the model provides the optimal planted acreage for each of the years
2002-2006, and for each value of the subjective probability about the future base update.
The results are presented in terms of the average of the optimal planted acreage, A¯, over
2002-2006. Under certainty that there is no future base update, this value is driven en-
tirely by market conditions and current government programs, and establishes a “business
as usual” baseline. Under certainty that there will be an opportunity to update base, this
value is driven by market conditions and the expectation that base updating will be allowed
for sure. A¯ is then the new base acreage for DPs. The stronger the belief that there will
be a future opportunity to update base, the stronger is the link between current acreage and
future payments. A¯ is weakly increasing in δ. We then compute the percentage increase
in A¯ relative to the baseline, to quantify the supply expansion effect of an expected base
update. The results indicate that the maximum percentage increase in A¯ is 6%. We also
look into alternate assumptions to investigate the robustness of our main result. The paper
is organized as follows. The model is discussed in the next section. Section 3 describes the
numerical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
Model
We follow Duffy and Taylor 1994 in formulating the acreage optimization problem for a
4
risk neutral farmer. The farmer produces a single crop, corn2, and faces price and yield
uncertainty, with price and yield being negatively correlated. She earns income from the
sale of her crop and government payments. Three government payments are considered.
The DPs, the countercyclical payments (CCP) and the loan deficiency payments (LDP).
The DPs and CCPs are paid on fixed base acres and program yield, though the CCPs are
triggered by low prices. The LDPs are also triggered by low prices, though these
payments are paid on current production. The CCPs were introduced in the 2002 FSRI
Act. These payments were given to farmers in 1998-2001 as the Market Loss Assistance
(MLA) payments because of low prices. These ad hoc payments were made permanent as
the CCPs. Thus updating base acreage would affect the DPs and CCPs. The per-period
profit of the farmer can be written as:
pit = P˜tY˜tAt +max(LR− (P˜t − 0.26), 0)Y˜tAt + 0.85D ∗BA ∗ Yd (1)
+0.85 ∗max(CR, 0) ∗BA ∗ Yc − TC(At),
where P˜t is the stochastic price, Y˜t is the stochastic yield, At is the current acreage, LR is
the loan rate, P˜t − 0.26 represents the posted county average price3, D is the DP rate, CR
is the CCP rate which equals TP −D −max(P˜t, LR), where TP is the target price and
2This simplifying assumption is made to reduce the dimensionality of computations and can be ratio-
nalized as representing a stylized aggregate agricultural crop supply, especially for low values of acreage
responses. As explained later, our cost of production specification indicates the ability to bring land into
production but does not stipulate where the new land comes from (competing crops or idled land).
3Babcock and Hart 2005 find that on average the posted county average price (used for computing the
LDP rate) is less than the season average price by 26 cents in the case of corn.
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TC is the total cost of production, which is a function of current acreage. BA is the base
acreage for the duration of the 2002 FSRI Act, and Yd and Yc are program yields for the
DPs and CCPs respectively. Thus profit, pit, is a function of P˜t, Y˜t and At.
The farmer faces policy uncertainty, in that she doesn’t know the policies that will be
in place for 2007-2011. Specifically, we consider the policy uncertainty about a future
opportunity to update base acreage. The farmer forms expectations about the possibility
of a future base update. This is captured by the farmer’s subjective probability about the
future base update, δ ∈ [0, 1]. Five values of δ are considered to capture the varying degree
of conviction that the farmer has regarding the future base update. δ = 0 implies that the
farmer is certain that base updating will not be allowed in the 2007 Farm Bill. On the other
hand, δ = 1 implies that the farmer is certain that base updating will be allowed in the
2007 Farm Bill. The farmer takes into account the possibility of a future base update, while
maximizing the present value of expected profits.
The farmer maximizes the present value of expected profits with respect to acreage over
the period 2002-11. The farmer’s problem can be expressed as:
max
At
E
[
4∑
t=0
βtpit(At, P˜t, Y˜t) + β
5(δV B + (1− δ)V NB)
]
, (2)
where β is the discount factor and E is the expectations operator, over price and yield. The
first term of (2) represents the maximization problem for 2002-2006. The terminal value
for this problem is specified by the possible future income stream from 2007-2011. There
are two possible income streams in 2007-2011; one associated with base updating, V B,
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and the second, associated with no base updating, V NB.
V B is the value function for the stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) problem asso-
ciated with base updating (SDPV B) and V NB is the value function for the SDP problem
associated with no base updating (SDPV NB). The farmer weighs the future income stream
with δ. As the farmer’s beliefs about the expected base update changes, land allocation
decisions in 2002-2006 are affected. Equation (2) also provides the link between acreage
decisions in 2002-2006 with future farm payments. This is because under base updating,
the new base (which is the average of the acreage planted in 2002-2006) affects V B. Hence,
the higher the value of δ, the stronger is the link between acreage planted in 2002-2006 and
future farm payments.
The two SDP problems are solved for a five-year time horizon, representing the years
2007-2011, for a discrete state and control space. The control or decision variable is the
current acreage, At, which is discretized into r values. The stochastic state variables are
price and yield. Both the variables are discretized into t and s number of states respectively.
Additionally, for SDPV B the state space includes all the possible values for the new base.
Since price and yield are stochastic, there is a probability associated with the realization of
each of the possible t price and s yield states. The probability transition matrix, which is
a (t ∗ s) × (t ∗ s) matrix contains these probabilities. An element pi,j,k,l of the probability
transition matrix represents the probability of moving from a current price of i and a yield
of j to a price of k and yield of l in the next period. We rewrite (2) as:
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max
At
4∑
t=0
t∑
k=1
s∑
l=1
βtP i,j,k,l−→pit(At, P˜t, Y˜t) +β5
t∑
k=1
s∑
l=1
P i,j,k,l(δ ∗−−→V B+ (1− δ) ∗−−−→V NB). (3)
The two SDP problems for 2007-2011 are:
V Bt(P˜t, Y˜t, BA′) =
maxAt
[∑t
k=1
∑s
l=1 P
i,j,k,lpit(P˜t, Y˜t, At, BA′) + β
∑t
k=1
∑s
l=1 P
i,j,k,lV Bt+1(P˜t+1, Y˜t, BA′)
]
,
t = 1, 2, ...5.
(4)
V NBt(P˜t, Y˜t) = maxAt
[∑t
k=1
∑s
l=1 P
i,j,k,lpit(P˜t, Y˜t, At) + β
∑t
k=1
∑s
l=1 P
i,j,k,lV NBt+1(P˜t+1, Y˜t)
]
,
t = 1, 2, ...5,
(5)
where BA′ is the new base acreage for the DPs and the CCPs for 2007-2011 and is the av-
erage of the acreage planted during 2002-2006. The option of not updating is also included
amongst all the possible base states considered. HereBA′ is treated as an endogenous state
variable.
The solution to equation (2) provides the optimal acreage planted in 2002-2006, which
depends on δ. Thus, corresponding to each value of δ, is an optimal acreage allocation. The
optimal acreage for δ = 0 (certainty of no base update), is determined by market conditions
and the farm policies of the 2002 FSRI Act. It is the benchmark we use to compare the
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optimal acreage for δ > 0. The difference between the optimal acreage for δ > 0 and δ = 0
measures the supply effect of the expected base update.
Numerical Solution
The numerical analysis is carried out at the national level using national season average
price and yield4. We also take into account payment limitations while computing profits5.
We assume that the farmer receives DPs and CCPs on a base acreage of 1000 acres.
Yd = 118 bu/acre is the same as the program yield established in the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade (FACT) Act of 1990. Farmers were given the opportunity to
update their program yields for the CCPs. The following two methods were allowed: (i)
93.5% of the 1998-2001 average yield or, (ii) Yd + 70% ∗ ((1998− 2001 average) −Yd). If
farmers chose not to update their yield then Yd would be used. With Yd = 118 bu/acre,
method (ii) results in the highest Yc and equals 130.48 bu/acre.
The functional form considered for the total cost6, TC(At), is F + bAt + cA3t where F
is the fixed cost and b and c are constants. Given F 7, we calibrate b and c for a 1000 acre
farm using the profit maximization condition and the acreage price elasticity 8.
4National level yields underestimate farm-level yield variability as the latter is about two to three times
more variable than the former. In the sensitivity analysis, we solve the model with increased yield variability.
We thank Bruce Babcock for raising this point.
5The 2002 Farm Act sets payment limits at $40,000 per person per fiscal year for DPs, at $65,000 for
CCPs and at $75,000 for LDPs. In our analysis the payment limitations are binding only for LDPs when
LR > P˜t − 0.26.
6We also consider an alternate specification as suggested by our colleague, David Hennessy. The results
are robust to this specification. See appendix A2 for details.
7Data for F has been taken from ERS data on production costs for corn for the year 2005.
8We use an estimate of acreage price elasticity equal to 0.412. This estimate has been taken from Lin
et al. 1996. We abstract from different supply responses to the LR and prices. See Appendix A1 for details
on total cost calibration.
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Both the price and yield state variables are discretized into eight values each, yielding
a total of 64 states. At is discretized into eight values, starting at 900 acres with increments
of 50 acres. Since the farmer can choose any one of the eight acreage choices in each of the
five years, 2002-2006, the total number of new base states is large (32,768) and, the total
number of states for SDPV B is even larger (32, 768 ∗ 64 = 2, 097, 152). For SDPV NB the
total number of states equal 64.
The elements in the probability transition matrix are derived from the joint distribution
of price and yield. We assume that price and yield follow a bivariate normal distribution
with negative correlation between price and yield9. The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test
whether the price and yield distributions follow a normal distribution. The null hypothesis
of normality could not be rejected at the 5% level of significance. Alternate distributions
for yield have been postulated in the literature. Particularly, the beta distribution has been
widely used to model yield distribution (for example, Babcock and Hennessy 1996, Hen-
nessy et al. 1997 and, Coble et al. 1996). We recognize the limitation of not allowing for
skewness in the yield distribution, but we employ the normal distribution to keep the com-
putation of the probability transition matrix tractable, since we are dealing with the joint
distribution of price and yield, where price and yield are correlated.
To compute the transition matrix, we also need to estimate the first and second moments
of price and yield. Equations for expected price and yield are estimated as seemingly
unrelated regressions, using time series data for the period 1980-2005 (price and yield data
9The correlation coefficient was estimated as -0.62 for price and yield for years 1980-2004 with a p value
of 0.001.
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are obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)). Nominal prices
are deflated to 2005 prices using the GDP price deflator. The results of the estimation are
obtained as10:
EYt = 95.80 + 1.95 ∗ T − 29.06 ∗Dy, (6)
EPt = 0.83 + 0.65 ∗ Pt−1 + 1.35 ∗Dp. (7)
Expected yield, EYt, depends on a trend variable, T and expected price, EPt, depends
on lagged price, Pt−1. Dy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for 1988 and 0 otherwise.
Dp is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for 1983 and 1995 and 0 otherwise. The dummy
variables are used to treat for outliers11. The variance of yield, σ2Y , is estimated as 115.31
and the variance of price, σ2P , is estimated as 0.162.
Yield is known to have an upward trend and it is important to capture this in the per-
period profit. To capture the trend in yield in (1) and to allow the yield states to be constant
over time, we transform yield into a standard normal variable while calculating probabili-
ties. Actual yield in a particular year, t, can be written as a function of the normalized yield
10All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. We also test for autocorrelated
errors in the yield and price series using the Durbin-Watson test for yield and Durbin’s h test for price. We
could not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 5% level of significance.
11Outliers in the price and yield series were detected using studentized residuals. An alternate specification
was also considered by deleting observations corresponding to the outlier years. Huber’s M estimation was
also used to identify outliers. In this case only outliers in the price series were detected, corresponding to the
same two years. Two specifications of the EYt and EPt equations are estimated, one with a dummy variable
for price and the second by deleting the observations for the outlier years. Finally we also estimate the two
equations without treating for outliers. The results are robust to all the specifications used. See appendix A3
for details.
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as Y˜t = Y˜n ∗ σY + E(Yt). We use this relation to substitute for Y˜ in the profit function.
Then, pit is a function of P˜t, Y˜n and At. Y˜n also replaces Y˜t as the state variable in (4)
and (5). Thus the yield states are specified in terms of Y˜n: -1.75, -1.25, -0.75, -0.25, 0.25,
0.75, 1.25 and 1.75. The following price states ($/bu) were chosen to represent the proba-
ble range of prices: 1.625, 1.875, 2.125, 2.375, 2.625, 2.875, 3.125 and 3.375. The price
and yield states have been constructed as mid-points of intervals. The first price interval
starts at $ 1.5/bu and goes upto a maximum of $ 3.5/bu in increments of 25 cents. The
first normalized yield interval starts at -2 bu/acre and goes upto a maximum of 2 bu/acre
in increments of 0.5 bu/acre. Probabilities are then derived from the joint distribution of
price and normalized yield12. While calculating the probability transition matrix we also
take into account the truncation caused by the loan rate on the joint distribution of price
and yield (following Greene 2002, chap. 22). We use numerical integration Miranda and
Fackler 2002, chap. 5 to compute the probability transition matrix.
SDPV B and SDPV NB are solved using backward recursion. The terminal value func-
tions, V B6 and V NB6 are initially assumed to be zero. We then solve for V B1 and V NB1
and substitute these back as V B6 and V NB6 to get an estimate of expected future income.
We then solve again for V B1 and V NB1. These are the values that enter in (3). Finally we
calculate the present value of expected profits as defined in (3) for each base state ∈ BA′.
The farmer maximizes the expected present value over all base, price and yield states.
12An element of the transition matrix, pi,j,k,l =
∫ k¯
k
∫ l¯
l
f(P, Yn; ρ)dYndP , where f(·) is the probability
density function of a bivariate normal distribution and ρ is the correlation coefficient between price and yield.
Price state k ∈ (k, k¯) and yield state l ∈ (l, l¯).
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Results
The solution to the optimization problem is the optimal planted acreage to be planted in
each of the years 2002-2006, conditional on the price state in the year 2001 and the
farmer’s subjective probability about the expected base update. For ease of exposition, we
present the results in terms of the average of the optimal planted acreage for the years
2002-2006, A¯, which is determined by the price states. This is because the expected price
states depend on the lagged price states (equation 7). This does not mean that yields have
no impact on the optimal acreage. The trend in yield affects the acreage choice in each
year, though this effect is equal across all price states. Hence, we present the results for
the eight price states. We refer readers to Appendix A4 for detailed annual results.
A¯ for each of the price states and all values of δ is shown in table 3. With a few
exceptions, A¯ strictly increases as δ increases. For price state $1.625/bu and δ = 0.25 and
0.5, price state $1.875/bu and δ = 0 and 0.25 and price state $2.125/bu and δ = 0, it is
optimal for the farmer not to make any changes to the acreage, i.e., it is optimal for the
farmer to continue planting 1000 acres in each of the years 2002-200613. This result is
driven by low prices. Figure 1 plots A¯ against the price states for each value of δ. As δ
increases, A¯ shifts outwards. Figure 2 measures the supply response to the expected base
update. When δ = 0, A¯ is determined by market conditions and farm programs in place
in 2002-2006. Thus, A¯ at δ = 0 is the benchmark to which we compare the A¯ for δ > 0.
A¯|δ>0 − A¯|δ=0 measures the supply effect of the expected base update. We also compute
13We assume that the farmer is producing 1000 acres at the beginning of 2002.
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the percentage increase in A¯ for δ > 0 relative to δ = 0. These are presented in table 4. For
price states, $1.625, $1.875 and $2.125/bu farmers receive both DPs and CCPs. There is
therefore a link between an expected base update and future DPs and CCPs. The maximum
percentage increase is 6% for $2.125/bu and δ = 1. It decreases to 4% as δ decreases to
0.5. For $2.125/bu, the percentage increase is the highest for all values of δ > 0. For
price states, $2.375, $2.625, $2.875, $3.125 and $3.375, only DPs are made to farmers and
therefore the results for these price states captures the supply effect of the expected base
update for the “decoupled” DPs. Note that the effect of the CCPs are not removed entirely
for these states, as there is a possibility of the realization of a low price state. However,
since the probability of the realization of a low price state is very small, the effect of the
CCPs are weak for these price states. Averaged over the five price states, the percentage
increase in acreage for δ = 1 is about 4%. When δ falls to 0.5 it decreases to less than 3%.
Uptil this point in our analysis, we assume that the policy parameters in the 2002 and
2007 Farm Bills remain the same and the farmer is faced only with uncertainty about the
expected future base update. Next we analyze the effect of a reduction in the loan rate and
the target price over 2007-2011, which would effect the LDPs and CCPs14. The reduced
rates are taken from FAPRI 2005. These rates have been reduced to meet the October
2005 U.S proposal in the WTO agricultural negotiations. First, we assume that there is no
uncertainty about the reduction in the LR and TP. We also solve the model by assuming
that there is uncertainty about the reduction in the LR and TP. Then, δ captures not only the
uncertainty about a future base update, but also the uncertainty about the reduction in LR
14The reduction in LR also affects the probability transition matrix, via the effect of truncation.
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and TP. With reduced LR and TP, (with and without uncertainty about their reduction), the
expected present value of profits are lower compared to our earlier results. However, there
is no change in A¯. This is because the reduction in the expected present value of profits is
not large enough to affect the optimal planted acreage.
We also conduct sensitivity analysis for a change in the acreage price elasticity. Results
for an acreage price elasticity of 0.6 are presented in tables 5 and 6, and figures 3 and 4.
Comparing tables 4 and 6 shows that increasing the acreage price elasticity has a signifi-
cant effect on the acreage supply response to the expected base update. However, the effect
remains small. The maximum percentage increase changes from 6% to around 8%. Much
Lower values of acreage price elasticity would be consistent with viewing our model as
a stylized representation of aggregate agricultural supply. Hence, the 6-8% range corre-
sponds to a single crop response to a future base update, whereas the response of aggregate
agricultural supply to a future base update would be much lower than 6%.
We also solve the model with increased yield variability15. Increased yield variability
results in a widening of the range of Y˜t (Y˜t = Y˜n ∗ σY + E(Yt)), which widens the range
of profits and expected profits. This results in a decrease in A¯ for most price states and
most values of δ. The results are presented in tables 7 and 8. However, the difference in the
percentage change in A¯ is small as compared to table 4. While important, yield variability
assumptions do not affect our qualitative results. The magnitude of the estimated acreage
expansion induced by possible future base update remains virtually unchanged.
15It is assumed that farm-level yields are three times more variable than national level yields.
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Conclusion
There is a large literature analyzing the effects of decoupled payments in the United States
(the PFC payments in the 1996 FAIR Act and the DPs in the 2002 FSRI Act) on farmer
decisions. The literature has identified five major coupling mechanisms of decoupled
payments. They arise because of the presence of uncertainty and imperfect credit markets;
because they affect the labor supply decisions of farmers and they increase land values
and rents. Farmers also form expectations about future decoupled payments and respond
to these expectations by changing current production decisions. The take home point from
the literature on decoupling as well as from our paper is that decoupled payments do have
some coupling effects, though these effects are small in magnitude. One obvious
exception is the impact of decoupled payments on land values. Since decoupled payments
are non-stochastic in nature and are paid on historical acreage, they increase land values
significantly. One obvious exception is the impact of decoupled payments on land values.
Since decoupled payments are non-stochastic in nature and are paid on historical acreage,
they increase land values significantly.
Our paper adds to the current literature, by presenting a formalized model to examine
and quantify the role of base updating in a farmer’s decision making process on current
acreage decisions. The latter has been conjectured but not formalized in previous analyses.
We analyze the effect of an expected base update in the 2007 Farm Bill on a farmer’s
acreage decision in 2002-2006, in the presence of price and yield uncertainty. The average
optimal planted acreage over 2002-2006 is weakly increasing in the subjective beliefs of
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the farmer about a future opportunity to update base acreage. We find that the maximum
percentage increase in the average of the optimal planted acreage over 2002-2006 is 6%,
conditional on price and certainty of a base update being allowed. At low prices, when
CCPs are positive, any opportunity to update base increases both the DPs and the CCPs.
But at higher prices the link between optimal acreage planted in 2002-2006 and future DPs
is stronger.
Our results indicate that expectations about future policies also influence producer de-
cisions. These results have important policy implications for the WTO negotiations in the
Doha round. At present, the proposals of the U.S. and EU, or even the Harbinson proposal
for the Doha round do not contain any changes to the green-box payments. Furthermore,
the WTO ruling against the cotton DPs in the United States, was on the basis of the planting
restrictions. The WTO appellate body did not rule against the base updating allowed for
the DPs. Our results provide a measure of the effect of base updating. Even though the
magnitude of the effect is small, base updating shouldn’t be allowed for decoupled pay-
ments. Hence, the green-box criteria for decoupled payments must be made very clear,
with no room for ambiguities. Once a base update is allowed, decoupled payments should
no longer be classified as green-box payments.
Lastly, our model assumes a single crop for tractability. In a more realistic scenario,
farmers would plant more crops and DPs would affect the allocation of land between these
crops drawing land away from non program crops in addition to drawing from idled land.
We mimic this situation with a higher acreage supply response but without any ability to say
17
what would happen to all individual crops. Rationalizing our model as a stylized aggregate
agricultural model, our results provide an upper bound on the aggregate supply response
to an expected base update. Last and somewhat offsetting, our analysis is conducted in
the short run. In the long run, costs curves are flatter and one would expect the acreage
response to be higher than in the short run, even in aggregate. In the long run, acreage
expansion resulting from expected future base update would also increase.
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Table 1. Model Parameters
β 0.95
BA 1000 acres
D 0.28
Yd 118 bu/acre
Yc 130.48 bu/acre
F $ 208230
b -23.47
c 0.00012
ρ -0.62
Table 2. Loan Rates and Target Price for 2002-2011
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
LR 1.98 1.98 1.95 1.95 1.95
TP 2.60 2.60 2.63 2.63 2.63
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
LR 1.91 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.74
TP 2.59 2.56 2.52 2.48 2.45
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Table 3. Average Optimal Planted Acreage over 2002-2006
δ
Price State 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 990 1000 1000 1020 1040
1.875 1000 1000 1020 1040 1050
2.125 1000 1020 1040 1050 1060
2.375 1030 1050 1050 1060 1080
2.625 1050 1060 1070 1090 1100
2.875 1070 1090 1100 1100 1120
3.125 1100 1100 1120 1130 1140
3.375 1120 1130 1140 1150 1160
Table 4. Percentage Change in A¯ Relative to δ = 0
δ
Price State 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 1.01 1.01 3.03 5.05
1.875 0.00 2.00 4.00 5.00
2.125 2.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
2.375 1.94 1.94 2.91 4.85
2.625 0.95 1.90 3.81 4.76
2.875 1.87 2.80 2.8 4.67
3.125 0.00 1.82 2.73 3.64
3.375 0.89 1.79 2.68 3.57
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Table 5. Average Optimal Planted Acreage over 2002-2006 with Acreage Price
Elasticity of 0.6
δ
Price State 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 1000 1010 1030 1050 1070
1.875 1010 1030 1050 1070 1090
2.125 1040 1050 1070 1090 1110
2.375 1060 1080 1100 1120 1130
2.625 1100 1110 1130 1140 1160
2.875 1130 1140 1160 1180 1190
3.125 1160 1180 1190 1210 1220
3.375 1190 1210 1220 1230 1250
Table 6. Percentage Change in A¯ relative to δ = 0 with Acreage Price Elasticity of 0.6
δ
Price State 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00
1.875 1.98 3.96 5.94 7.92
2.125 0.96 2.88 4.81 6.73
2.375 1.89 3.77 5.66 6.60
2.625 0.91 2.73 3.64 5.45
2.875 0.88 2.65 4.42 5.31
3.125 1.72 2.59 4.31 5.17
3.375 1.68 2.52 3.36 5.04
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Table 7. Average Optimal Planted Acreage over 2002-2006 with increased yield
variability
δ
Price State 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 950 950 970 990 1000
1.875 960 980 1000 1000 1020
2.125 1000 1000 1010 1030 1040
2.375 1010 1030 1040 1050 1060
2.625 1050 1050 1060 1080 1090
2.875 1060 1080 1100 1100 1110
3.125 1100 1100 1110 1130 1140
3.375 1120 1140 1150 1150 1160
Table 8. Percentage change in A¯ relative to δ = 0 with increased yield variability
δ
Price State 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 0.00 2.11 4.21 5.26
1.875 2.08 4.17 4.17 6.25
2.125 0.00 1.00 3.00 4.00
2.375 1.98 2.97 3.96 4.95
2.625 0.00 0.95 2.86 3.81
2.875 1.89 3.77 3.77 4.72
3.125 0.00 0.91 2.73 3.64
3.375 1.79 2.68 2.68 3.57
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Figure 1. Average optimal planted acreage 
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Figure 2. Difference between average optimal planted acreage at 0>δ  over 0=δ  
 
 26
 
1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
900
950
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
Price States
A
ve
ra
ge
 O
pt
im
al
 P
la
nt
ed
 A
cr
ea
ge
delta=0
delta=0.25
delta=0.5
delta=0.75
delta=1
 
Figure 3. Average optimal planted acreage with acreage price elasticity of 0.6 
 
1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Price States
A
cr
ea
ge
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
de
lta
 >
 0
 a
nd
 d
el
ta
 =
 0
0.25 - 0
0.5 - 0
0.75 - 0
1 - 0
 
Figure 4. Difference between average optimal planted acreage at 0>δ  over 0=δ  
with acreage price elasticity of 0.6 
 
Appendices
A1. Total cost calibration
Data for the fixed cost, F, has been taken from Economic Research Service (ERS) data on
production costs for corn. F has been defined as the total allocated overhead per acre and
includes the following: (i) hired labor, (ii) opportunity cost of unpaid labor, (iii) capital
recovery of machinery and equipment, (iv) opportunity cost of land (rental rate), (v) taxes
and insurance and, (vi) general farm overhead. Given F, we solve for the coefficients, b
and c, using the profit maximization condition and the acreage price elasticity. We
calibrate total cost to 2005 data. The corn price and yield, equal $1.9/bu and 147.9 bu/acre
respectively. For a 1000 acre farm, F = $208, 230.
(1) pit = P¯tY¯tAt +max(LR− (P¯t − 0.26), 0)Y¯tAt +DP + CCP − (F + bA+ cA3).
DPs and CCPs do not enter into the profit maximization condition. The LR for 2005
was $1.95/bu, while the corn price was $1.9/bu. This results in a positive LDP rate. The
profit maximization condition with a positive LDP rate is:
(2)
∂pi
∂A
= (LR + 0.26)Y¯ − b− 3cA2 = 0.
The optimal acreage responds to the loan rate, LR and we have:
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(3)
∂A
∂LR
LR
A
=
(
(LR + 0.26) ∗ Y¯ − b
3c
)−1/2
LR ∗ Y¯
6cA
.
We solve for b and c for a 1000 acre corn farmer, with an acreage price elasticity equal
to 0.412. We get b = −23.47 and c = 0.00012.
A2. Alternate Specification of Total cost
An alternate specification of total cost considered is, TC(At) = F + γAη. We calibrate γ
and η, following the method specified in A1, with the same data. The per-period profit is
given by:
(4) pit = P¯tY¯tAt +max(LR− (P¯t − 0.26), 0)Y¯tAt +DP + CCP − (F + γAη).
The profit maximization condition with a positive LDP rate is :
(5)
∂pi
∂A
= (LR + 0.26)Y¯ − γηAη−1 = 0.
From the FOC:
(6) LR + 0.26 =
γηAη−1
Y¯
.
28
and,
(7)
∂LR
∂A
=
γη(η − 1)Aη−2
Y¯
.
Acreage Price elasticity,  = ∂A
∂LR
LR
A
= LR
(η−1)(LR+0.26) , which allows us to identify η
as LR
(LR+0.26)
+ 1. This in turns gives us, γ = (LR+0.26)Y¯
ηAη−1 . Solving we get, η = 3.14 and
γ = 0.00004 for LR = 1.95, A = 1000 and Y¯ = 147.9 bu/acre.
The results for A¯ and the percentage change in A¯ relative to δ = 0 are presented below.
Comparison with Tables 3 and 4 indicates that the results very similar with this specification
of total cost.
29
Table A2.1: Average Optimal Planted Acreage
δ
Price State 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 1000 1000 1010 1030 1050
1.875 1000 1010 1030 1050 1050
2.125 1010 1040 1050 1050 1070
2.375 1050 1050 1060 1070 1090
2.625 1050 1070 1090 1100 1100
2.875 1090 1100 1100 1120 1130
3.125 1100 1110 1130 1140 1150
3.375 1130 1140 1150 1160 1170
Table A2.2: Percent change in A¯ relative to δ = 0
δ
Price State 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1.625 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00
1.875 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00
2.125 2.97 3.96 3.96 5.94
2.375 0.00 0.95 1.90 3.81
2.625 1.90 3.81 4.76 4.76
2.875 0.92 0.92 2.75 3.67
3.125 0.91 2.73 3.64 4.55
3.375 0.88 1.77 2.65 3.54
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A3. Alternate Specifications for the estimation of expected price and yield
Outlier detection for the price and yield series has been conducted using two methods.
The first method used to identify outliers, compares the studentized residuals to the
critical value t(1− α
2
;n− k − 2), where k is the number of explanatory variables
excluding the intercept, n is the total number of observations and α is the significance
level. For n = 25 and k = 1 and 5% significance level, the critical value is
t(0.975; 22) = 2.074. Comparing this to the absolute value of the studentized residuals,
leads to the identification of one outlier in the yield series (corresponding to the year 1988
(yield = 84.6 bu/acre) and to two outliers in the price series (corresponding to years 1983
and 1995 (deflated price = 5.44 and 3.89 respectively). Based on this, two alternate
specifications (models 1 and 2) have been considered. The first one employs dummy
variables to capture the effect of these years. Dy is the dummy variable used in the yield
equation and is equal to 1 if year = 1988 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Dp is the dummy
variable used in the price equation and is equal to 1 if year = 1983 and 1995 and 0
otherwise. The second model is estimated after deleting observations for the outlier years.
Model 1
EYt = β0 + β1time+ β2Dy (1)
EP (t) = γ0 + γ1Pt−1 + γ2Dp (2)
Model 2
EY (t) = β0 + β1T (3)
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EP (t) = γ0 + γ1Pt−1 (4)
Using robust regression (Huber’s M estimation), only outliers in the price series are
identified. The outliers identified are the same as the ones identified using the studentized
residuals. Model 3 is estimated with a dummy variable for the price equation. Model 4 is
estimated after deleting observations for the price outlier years.
Model 3
EY (t) = β0 + β1T (5)
EP (t) = γ0 + γ1Pt−1 + γ2Dp (6)
Model 4
EY (t) = β0 + β1T (7)
EP (t) = γ0 + γ1Pt−1 (8)
Finally model 5 is estimated using all 25 observations without accounting for price and
yield outliers.
Model 5
EY (t) = β0 + β1T (9)
EP (t) = γ0 + γ1Pt−1 (10)
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All specifications have been estimated using Seemingly Unrelated regression (SUR); T
is a trend variable and Pt−1 is lagged price.
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Table A3.1: Comparing estimates of coefficients across models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Robust regression
Parameter Estimates
βˆ0 95.80 97.73 93.48 94.52 92.80 96.10
βˆ1 1.95 1.85 2.04 1.98 2.09 1.89
βˆ2 -29.06 - - - - -
γˆ0 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.63 0.93
γˆ1 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.72 0.62
γˆ2 1.35 - 1.37 - -
Table A3.2: Comparing estimates of yield and price variance across models and R2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
σˆ2Yt 115.31 83.43 145.11 123.58 145.11
σˆ2Pt 0.162 0.19 0.162 0.18 0.226
R2Y 0.6950 0.6924 0.5987 0.6284 0.5987
R2P 0.8279 0.7076 0.8279 0.7127 0.6376
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A4. Optimal planted acreage for each of the years 2002-06
Table A4.1: Optimal Planted Acreage
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
δ $1.625
0 950 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.25 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.5 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.75 1000 1000 1000 1050 1050
1 1000 1050 1050 1050 1050
$1.875
0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.25 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.5 1000 1000 1000 1050 1050
0.75 1000 1050 1050 1050 1050
1 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
$2.125
0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
0.25 1000 1000 1000 1050 1050
0.5 1000 1050 1050 1050 1050
0.75 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
1 1050 1050 1050 1050 1100
$2.375
0 1000 1000 1050 1050 1050
0.25 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
0.5 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
0.75 1050 1050 1050 1050 1100
1 1050 1050 1100 1100 1100
$2.625
0 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
0.25 1050 1050 1050 1050 1100
0.5 1050 1050 1050 1100 1100
0.75 1050 1100 1100 1100 1100
1 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
$2.875
0 1050 1050 1050 1100 1100
0.25 1050 1100 1100 1100 1100
0.5 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
0.75 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
1 1100 1100 1100 1150 1150
$3.125
0 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
0.25 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
0.5 1100 1100 1100 1150 1150
0.75 1100 1100 1150 1150 1150
1 1100 1150 1150 1150 1150
$3.375
0 1100 1100 1100 1150 1150
0.25 1100 1100 1150 1150 1150
0.5 1100 1150 1150 1150 1150
0.75 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150
1 1150 1150 1150 1150 1200
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